Introduction
Beginning with the failed Somali republic(1), coupled with the unilateral declaration of secession by the Somali National Movement (SNM) on May 18, 1991, separatism in the north has taken new heights. In the last two decades, the Hargaysa administration made a concerted effort to establish a new “reality on the ground” to effectuate a separate state in what was Northern Somalia.3 After several inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts in the 1990s ended the second inter-Isaaq’s civil war “in part by awarding a greater share of parliamentary seats to members of "opposition" clans and in part through the development of an "interim constitution" which, after much negotiation and modification, served as the prototype for the current version,” “Somaliland” seems to have established a new  “reality on the ground.”4 The surprising fall of Las Anod into Hargaysa with ease on October 15, 2007, a town that rejected secession in favor of unity, could be viewed as an effort to complete the reconstruction of a new “reality on the ground” by those seeking secession.
Nevertheless, the region still remains part of Somalia, albeit with a relatively better administration than the rest of the country. As the West re-engages the ailing Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, to secure the capital city, Mogadishu, the prospect for any forthcoming recognition for Somaliland becomes more challenging.5 There is a general understanding by both unionists and secessionists alike that stable Southern Somalia may greatly hinder, if not fatally kill, the hope for recognition. And this is a source for political frustration in “Somaliland,” often leading it to mount intermittent cross-border raids against the neighboring autonomous region of Puntland. With the emerging new debate in the US Pentagon to recognize “Somaliland,” the State Department standing in the way notwithstanding,6 a complete change of “Somaliland’s” status quo may lead to larger scale inter-clan conflict in the region.

Themes on Secession Ideology

In some quarters, secession is generally synonymous with the concept of self-determination. Self-determination is in turn a political program, led and organized by elites claiming to represent a group of people dissatisfied in a given political arrangement. There is no clear notion whether the group seeking secession is a minority group that is oppressed, or a majority group that does the oppressing. There are situations where a politically and economically powerful minority group oppresses a majority. Such are the historical cases of the Ethiopian Amhara, the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the Sunnis in Iraq. However, in most cases a powerful and entrenched majority ethnic group [mis]rules a minority group(s), and excludes or limits political participation of the latter. A case in point is Tsarist Russia where the powerful and numerous Russians colonized and ruled many nations and nationalities for many generations.
The debate about secession was well articulated by 20th Century leftist revolutionaries. In Lenin’s “Critical Remarks on National Question,”7 a highly influential book in the left circles until recently, one is struck by the intensity of the debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. The two communists, among others, passionately debated the issue of when a nationality is justified to secede from its host country. The most critical cases were those of Finland, Poland, and Armenia. After long spirited debates, both Lenin and Luxemburg, as well as their acolytes, came to one conclusion: that both Poland and Finland would be better off to leave the Russian Empire, while Armenia stays with the rest of the empire under a reorganized Soviet system. In addition to the geopolitics of the day, factors that helped justify, for example, the secession cases of Poland and Finland from the Russian Empire are cultural, linguistic and geographical dissimilarities with the administering power.

Then, there is the Wilsonian (Liberal) school of thought that, at the turn of the 20th Century, interjected more vigor and energy into the debate of secession and self-determination. American isolationist policy at the time notwithstanding, Woodrow Wilson8 quickly seized the concept of self- determination to make American foreign policy more relevant to international politics. In doing so, he drafted his 14 points position paper on international politics and self-determination in which he attempted to provide a framework for freedom to indigenous groups from colonial and feudal rules, while arguing for protecting sovereignty.9 In Article XIII of his 14 points, Wilson called for this: “An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.” Wilson’s second concept of self-determination is one that sought the protection and safeguarding of the territorial integrity of nation states, thereby suggesting that all nations have the right to self-determination, hence equating territorial integrity to the rights of nations to exist in a secure and natural boundary respected by all. In Article XIV, Wilson put it this way: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” This latter article of Wilson’s concept of “self determination” is now enshrined in the United Nation’s Charter, and it protects the territorial integrity and nation states.

In short, the concept of secession as a tool to gain self-determination, both in the left as well as in the Wilsonian view, is rarely applied, for it sets higher threshold prior to implementation. Most insurgent movements or breakaway regions rarely succeed in satisfying all the intellectual, legal and international requirements that regulate this concept in its strict sense. The International community at large and the United Nations in particular would like to deal with conflicts, political as well as cultural between communities in a given country, through other means of conflict resolution short of sanctioning secession. However, the United Nation’s concept of self-determination is often invoked to uphold the territorial integrity of member states which are protected by existing international instruments.

Despite the prolonged civil war (from 1991 to 2007) that has devastated the hitherto cohesive Somalia, the world community has so far upheld this concept as it applies to the statehood of Somalia. On the other hand, “Somaliland’s” bid for a unilateral secession seems to have met its challenges in the prevailing interpretations of international instruments that apply to Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Without exception, secession by no means is an African or a Third World political problem, but a worldwide modern political problem. Since 1955, for example, over 71 [separatist] conflicts have been recorded around the globe, 25 of which were engaged in violent conflicts as of 2004.10 From the Irish issue, which has been a thorn in Britain’s modern history, to the issue of the Basque region in Spain, and to the Chechnya ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, Europe had its own entanglements with secessionism in most of its recent past and current history as well. Hakan Wieber documents approximately over 100 secessionist political movements in modern history, most of which ended up withering away or seeking other means of political conflict resolution to address their respective grievances.11

Employing extensive empirical data, Pierre Englerbert and Rebecca Hummel identify and discuss several major variables that produce political separatism including, but not limited to, ethnic or religious conflicts (like the case in Ethiopia) , conflicts over resources (Biafra and Katanga) and cultural heterogeneity (Ethiopia) in a nation state.12 But the most serious separatist-prone cases are found in those “countries that are constituted of two or more distinct land masses.”13 The latter case was true for Bangladesh vis-à-vis Pakistan. Because of Bangladesh’s success of acquiring recognition, after a long protracted war, proponents of “Somaliland’s” secession often invoke it for inspiration and guidance.14 However, the following two factors which have heavily weighed on the outcome of the Bangladesh war of secession are absent in the case of “Somaliland”: (1) the geographic separation of Bangladesh from the rest of mainland Pakistan made the war unsustainable for Pakistan. Due to this separation, proponents for secession in this case prevailed to place the Bangladesh case under the Unite Nation’s Resolution (1541) (XV) of the General Assembly, “which indicates that prima facie evidence of that status of a territory exists if it is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it;” and (2) the geopolitics of the era, where India, with the help of the then Soviet Union, successfully armed Bengalese to their teeth, ultimately made the war almost prohibitive for Pakistan to win any time soon.

Consequently, on January 12, 1972, after a protracted war that caused the death of many civilians on both sides, Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan. Only two years after such a declaration, on February 2, 1974, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as an independent country, soon (September 17, 1974) to be followed by a full status given to Bangladesh at the UN, which predictably precipitated full international and bilateral recognition by many nations. However, “Somaliland” is neither geographically separate, nor culturally, ethnically, nor historically different from the rest of Somalia. As such, the two Resolutions (1541) (XV) and (2649) (XXV) of the General Assembly,15 which govern and arbitrate issues of secession, hardly apply to the “impromptu” secession declared by “Somaliland.”

Secession Experience in the Horn of Africa16 |

Ethiopia, an ancient empire in the horn of Africa region, with several major ethnic, religious and regional groupings, offers glaring and more valuable lessons in the history of secessionist movements. Secessionist movements in Ethiopia trace their origins back to the concept of lack of equality for ethnic groups, whose claim for self-determination, as a result, are measured in varied interpretations. As early as the 1970s, responding to growing secessionist sentiments, Ethiopia was gripped by debates on “the question of what is to be done nations and nationalities.” Kifflue Taddese, in his [largely memoir] book, The Generations, traces back these debates to the radical students’ discourses at the then Haile Selassie University,17 which housed the country’s elite children. The question of what done with nations and nationalities in the peripheral regions, such as Eritreans, Somalis, Oromos, Afars, to just name a few, that “were less integrated into the Ethiopian political life,” was at the center of the debates.18 The undying Somali secessionist movements in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia, with a life span of over a half century, is seemingly resilient and still grips western newspapers’ headlines to date.19 Likewise, the Oromo question was raised in the 1970s.20

Most of all, though, the Eritrean question occupied the center of the debates, mainly for two reasons: One, the war for independence in the Eritrean front, first started by Muslim Eritreans and the Awaita group, was having negative social and political impacts on Addis Ababa, due to the capital’s proximity to the front line. Second, Eritreans inside Ethiopia, particularly those actively participating in the radical university students’ debates, were playing a decisive role in shaping the debates, hence positioning the Eritrean question in the center.

The Eritrean war for secession against Ethiopia’s imperial court, and later on against the autocratic rule of the Dergue, was one of the longest wars for secession in history.21 Unlike other African secessionist movements, the Eritrean question was born out of Ethiopia’s violent nullification (emphasis added) of the federation status that the former had, dismissing the free and independent national parliament of Eritrea. It was that nullification of the sprit of federalism, plus the banning of the Tigrinya language for popular use, a different language from Ethiopia’s national Amharic, that triggered the Eritrean war of independence, which started in earnest in 1962.22

The existence of secession-inducing factors such as linguistic, cultural, and historical differences between Eritrea and Ethiopia have sustained and fed the vigor and determination of secessionist sentiments among Eritreans, irrespective of several administrative reforms introduced by subsequent Ethiopian governments all of which were intended to abate ethnic demands.23 In 1991, a combined army of Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) successfully defeated the Dergue army and quickly put the whole country under their joint control. Even with over thirty years of war under their belt, and a de facto independence from Ethiopia due to a military victory over the powerful Dergue army, Eritrean leaders, unlike those of the SNM in “Somaliland,” did not declare a unilateral secession. On the contrary, they waited for three long years and eventually accepted Ethiopia’s proposals for a settled solution - a referendum prior to official secession. On September 15, 1994, a jointly administered referendum was held to vote on whether to secede from the rest of Ethiopia, or stay in a federally reorganized Ethiopia.
The yes vote for independence of that plebiscite affirmed and legitimized the secession of Eritrea both in the eyes of the sitting Ethiopian government and in the rest of the world community. Without such a negotiated settlement, the case of the Eritrean secession could have stalled, and the hands of the AU and UN in particular to apply Resolutions (1541)

(XV) and (2649) (XXV) of the General Assembly may have been tied up to do anything other than maintain the status quo. It is the agreed referendum at which the two sides arrived that made the Eritrean case an amicably settled divorce. Likewise, in the case of Somalia, international instruments would stipulate that “Somaliland” must first seek its objectives within the framework of the “parent” state.24 Mogadishu’s say so in this case is a key to any future “negotiated settlement.”

Matt Bryden, one of the more vocal advocates for “Somaliland’s” secession and a key figure until recently at the influential International Crisis Group (ICG), underscores the problematic issue of getting recognition for Somaliland’s unilateral secession.25 In a brief typology of “negotiated settlements” for conflicts in the Horn of Africa, Bryden concludes that both the Eritrean experience (a successfully negotiated secession) and the Southern Sudan peace model (a potentially autonomous region) would pose serious challenges for “Somaliland.” In both cases, the aggrieved regions are obligated to negotiate with their respective national governments. The course that Eritrea traveled in its pursuit for secession is what Mat Bryden calls the “Eritrean model,” a model not seemingly viable in “Somaliland” due to what he calls an ill-advised “impromptu” secessionist move by SNM.

Until the Buroa Convention of May 18, 1991, when the SNM declared a unilateral secession and in doing so unexpectedly undermining a “Draft Proposal for A Transitional Government” 26 proposed by Ahmed Silanyo, former chairman of the front, the SNM advocated federalism.27 According to Bryden’s assessment, secession can only succeed if “Somaliland” first reverses its unilateral action and starts afresh negotiations with the South to either mutually nullify the “Act of Union” of 1961 between ex-British “Somaliland” Protectorate and ex-Italian Somali territory, or seek some other [federal] arrangement. This proposal is plausible and could be the only way to resolve the current stalemate characterizing the Northern question. The brief period M. Farah Aydiid ruled Mogadishu (1991-1994) represents a missed opportunity too for proponents of secession. Because Aid was so desperate to consolidate his rule that secessionists could possibly have reached a quid pro quo deal where Mogadishu could have let Hargaysa go. But a democratically negotiated settlement in the north, observed and preferably supervised by a third party, with a prominent role reserved for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, could have led to broaden both the ranks of participants and the scope of the negotiation; voices that were not adequately heard in the previous Buroa Convention (May 18, 1991) could under this scenario prominently play a unionist role, and that might not have augured well for full-blown secession.

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