Is “Somaliland’s” “Impromptu” Secession Justified?

The simple question of what legitimizes “Somaliland’s” unilateral secession from the rest of the country is more complex than meets the eye. Despite the devastating confrontation with the merciless autocratic regime of Barre, coupled with “Somaliland” leaders’ impressive diplomatic work, there is seemingly a marked resistance by the international community to guarantee recognition to the unilateral declaration of secession by the SNM. At first, especially before the 9/11, 2001 terrorist bombings of the twin towers in New York, the strategy to convince the outside world on the merits of “Somaliland’s” recognition hung on what some viewed as “democracy dividends” (Shine, 2002).50 This strategy is intended to woe the West and other regional governments to reward “Somaliland” in kind with recognition for its commitment to multi-party liberal democracy. However, given the degree of corruption and human rights abuses and (the deportation of Mr. Jaam’a M. Qaalib, a leading unionist from his own home region, or the rape of the young Daarood girl, Zamzam Du’aale, because she was alleged/suspected of masterminding an assassination plot against “Somaliland’s” superstitious vice president (now president), and the virtual absence of dialogue on the very issue that impacts the different clans in the region (an open discussion on secession), many see the claimed “democracy dividends” as an attempt to seize on the buzz word of the moment and seek to camp with the political order of the day. After the incidents of 9/11 rearranged the West’s priorities, advocates for secession quickly shifted strategy to now emphasize the geopolitical role an independent “Somaliland” can offer the West in the “war on terrorism.” Peter Schraeder, in an unusually simplistic pronouncement, takes this to its extreme by suggesting that “Somaliland deserves recognition if the Bush administration is truly sincere about promoting democracy in the wider Middle East.”51 Others still suggested that a recognized “Somaliland” is a deterrent to a future “Somali irredentism,” hence good news for Ethiopia, an ally in “the war on terror” and a Christian-island in the Horn of Africa region. Even some wanted to woe Eritrea into the plate as expressed here: “Eritrea, which received a de facto independence from Ethiopia in 1991 and de jure independence in 1993, seemingly is a country that would be sympathetic to “Somaliland’s independence.”52 But, given other geopolitical priorities, neither the West, nor Ethiopia, nor Eritrea, gave credence to the solicitation. Beyond what could be called mere diplomatic solicitations, following are four arguments articulated mainly by sympathetic academics for secession.

Legal Arguments: In recent years, a new school of thought’s debate hinges on whether separatist movements can achieve their goal by creating a new “reality on the ground” has emerged. Despite international and national norms, altered “reality on the ground” makes discussions about recognition a moot subject, and simply a matter of semantics. By expanding and giving a radical interpretation to the Montevideo Convention, Alison Eggers argues that “Somaliland” has satisfied the requirements for recognition in that it has

1. established a permanent government; has
2. a defined territory;
3. a permanent population; and
4. a capacity to enter into relationship with other states are prerequisite for statehood.

Although it is plausible to argue that Somaliland has established a somewhat permanent but fragile government, it is not a government that can enter into any meaningful relationship with either bilateral governments or international bodies. Moreover, neither the population nor the territory claimed by “Somaliland” is defined. Besides, an international law presupposes that a secessionist part must do so within the framework of the “parent” state. Mogadishu’s say so in this case is all the more pivotal.
The legal argument surrounding the sovereignty of the state of Somalia vis-à-vis that of “Somaliland” rests on the nullification of the latter’s status prior to the implementation of the “Act of Union.”53 Except achieving independence from Britain, there are no official records to substantiate whether “Somaliland” was a sovereign entity recognized by any member state either in the immediate region or in the rest of the world.54 Despite David Shinn’s apparent lack of documented sources on this claim, the “Act of Union,”55 which was promulgated by both sides on January 31, 1961 makes all prior arrangements null and void. Paolo Contini, an irrefutable authority on the technicalities of the “Act of Union,” writes: “Thus when the union was formed, its precise legal effects had not been laid down in any instrument having binding force in both parts of the State. As explained below, the matter was clarified seven months later by the adoption of a new Act of Union with retroactive effect from July 1, 1960 for the whole territory of the Republic”.56 It goes on to say:

This is one of the main challenges secessionists regularly face in the legal arena of the debate. Moreover, the north at independence had neither a separate national anthem nor a flag nor any of the insignia known to denote distinguished qualities of a nation state.58 All that existed at the time was the all-encompassing national flag of Somalia and its national anthem. This is to say that even leaders in the North did not anticipate a separate government for the ex-British protectorate. Although there was an insignificant opposition to a united Somalia, and a brief and less publicized flirtation by Egal with the Haile Selassie of Ethiopia prior to the date of independence, the triumph of unity forces, propelling Egal to the office of prime minister (as was endorsed by USP and SNL supporters), was inevitable.

End of Somali Nationalism: A second argument in favor of secession hinges on the effects the Barre regime wrought on Somalia; the singling out and targeting of the Isaaq community for atrocities as well as “decades of experiences of oppression and civil war”59 arguably fed and cemented the ideology of secession in the north. With a sense of apocalyptic prediction for Somali nationalism, this outlook maintains that since Somali nationalism ran out of steam with Barre’s government, “Somaliland,” a region dominated by the Isaaq clan, needs to reassert its separate identity outside of Somalia.60 This position flies in the face of existing academic literature on the affinity that existed within the Somali communities. For example, “Unlike so many other cases, Somali cultural nationalism is a centuries old phenomenon and not something which has been recently drummed up to give credence to political claims,” writes Lewis.61 Moreover, Hussein Adam adds that “clan and lineage antagonisms do not preclude a will to unite or a feeling of common destiny …”62 Unlike those prematurely calling for the disintegration of Somalia, it is here where one would, with a measured comfort, argue that due to the inherent lineage-based clan nature of “centripetal and centrifugal [tendencies], at once drawing the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of kinship affinity and cultural solidarity while setting them against one another,”63 that today’s disintegration may not be the final chapter of Somali history. Complicated by the negative exogenous factors, such as Ethiopian and Western interferences, the Somali society has in all its modern history experienced setbacks/dislocations followed by renewed nationalist surges, just like the boom and bust cycles of economic waves, where the clan factor is both a challenge and a resource.

For example, after the defeat of Sayyid M. Abdullah Hasan, the society that has sustained over 1 million casualties, more or less disintegrated to the lowest clan or sub clan organizational unit, and remained so up until the early 1940s, only to bounce back again with an un-paralleled nationalist surge during and after WWII. Again, owing to the let down by the civilian government between 1960-68 (as a result of the devastating impact of the 1964 war with Ethiopia and the runway corruption and clan politics), social cohesion suffered greatly. With the mobilization of the entire Somali Society on a well defined purpose and national objective in the 1970s (development, literacy and self-reliance), Somalia was once again as cohesive as any nation can be.64 But all that had evaporated with the Barre regime losing the war against Ethiopia in 1978, and then afterwards turning its guns on its own people, mainly against dissident groups. (The Isaaq and the Majeerteen clans suffered the brunt of Barre’s wrath.) However, to base the unilateral “Somaliland” secession on this national misfortune, with the intent to carry out the onslaught on the Somali nation state, amounts to a mutilation of social science and the scholarship on Somali Studies in favor of promoting an activist objective. If secession advocates (and I would include Lewis in this camp) believed only twenty or so years ago the organic nature of the Somali nation, in whose argument, then, is implicit the recognition of the long trajectory of history that it took to shape this nation’s socio-cultural affinity, the hastiness to view the current setback of the Somali social cohesion beyond [passing] civil war, can’t pass the scrutiny of serious social science critique. This last misfortune of the society should not by any means constitute the obituary of the Somali nation state.

Somaliland-Eritrean Linkage : A third argument to buttress justification for secession is one that likens the SNM’s experience with that of Eritrea. Just as much as Eritrea was able to create a cohesive national identity out of nine ethnic nationalities and three religious groupings by reason of the long protracted struggle for independence from Ethiopia, argues this school of thought, so did clans in “Somaliland” develop nationhood qualities in their war against the Barre regime. How much of what the SNM stood for and its organizational infrastructure compare to that of the EPLF? Daniel Compangnon offers an intimate account of the SNM militia in the 1980s as angry tribesmen who were often agitated by their leaders on the notion that they were fighting imaginary Daarood forces, and “the Isaaq crowds sometimes shouted: "Daarood Adoon. An Isaaq will be more easily mobilized while shouting ‘Daarood Adoon’" instead of "Down with the dictatorship."(This slang translates to “Daaroods are slaves.”) He raises the perplexing question of “Is an opposition movement, however, entitled to fuel and manipulate such a feeling in order to win a broader audience?” This depiction of the SNM is a far cry from the highly organized, ideologically disciplined Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), who administered liberated areas better than the Ethiopian held villages. Contrary to the SNM’s clan-orientation that ran a vendetta driven clan militia, the EPLF employed left-oriented analysis of issues and opportunities, thus accordingly developing a political program that it had carefully applied both to its constituents and to the rest of Ethiopia.

The “Somaliland”-Eritrean comparison does not hold water either, and, when critically examined, could show serious theoretical deficiencies. Only considering the surface differences, Eritrea is more dissimilar than it is similar to “Somaliland”. The former is inhabited by nine different nationalities with distinct languages, culture, religions, race, and historical background. Second, Eritrea is ethnically and culturally different from Ethiopia, the country it wanted to secede from, which houses as many as more than 400 ethnic groups. Third, Eritrea federated with Ethiopia under international supervision, and when Ethiopia unilaterally nullified the terms of federation, Eritrea quickly sought to reassert its statehood. Eritrea thus qualified, under United Nations rules, as “peoples,” deserving independence. On the contrary, “Somaliland,” with its mere four or so inter-married clan families, neither exhibits any of the above mentioned characteristics nor had a relationship with its sister ex-Italian Somaliland akin to the Ethio-Eritrean complex relationship.

Social Inequality: It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify and explain secession on the basis of social inequality which the Isaaq clan has suffered at the hands of southern clans. There are about four major clans (Daarood, Isaaq, Hawiye and the Maay groupings). Most of all, the Isaaq community has never been oppressed in a particular way, and did not suffer any visible discrimination or domination based on race, cultural or ethnic differences. Nor were they the victims of linguistic oppression as may be the cause with the Somali Bantu minorities in the south. Donald Horowitz suggests that the location of an ethnic group’s home territory often provided a head start. Groups located near colonial capitals, near a rail-line or port, or near some center of colonial commerce were well situated to take up opportunities as they arose. Hence, he argues “the Hawiya and Isaaq in Somalia are some of the groups that found themselves fortuitously situated near centers of colonial activity.” 65 In other words, communities in Hargaysa, Berbera (Isaaq inhabited centers) and Mogadishu (Hawiye inhabited and the capital of the nation) stood during the 100 or so years of colonial rule in Somalia to benefit more compared to other clans in the interior districts of the country.
He further suggests that the Daaroods were the single largest group in both the Italian and British “Somaliland’s” armies, which, in time, fueled Daarood’s nationalism and their potential for making up Somalia’s political power base. Outside the Madigan experience, who are treated as a cast, ethnic oppression is not so much pronounced, or is even non-existent, but ethnic opportunities were in the hands of the three major tribes in Somalia. These major tribes or clans are by and large of equal muscles, politically, socially and economically, that some sort of détente exists. Since 1960, when the two regions signed the reunification act, only 4 days after the north got its independence from Great Britain, which coincided with the day of Independence, July 1, 1960, power has been fairly and equitably shared among these groups. A more lucid fact to dispel the alleged oppression of the Isaaq clan is that in the Barre’s government, which was a most dictatorial regime, the Isaaqs had a vice president (Ali Abokor) and six or seven ministers out of 21 cabinet positions.

Concluding Remarks: Averting Renewed Civil War in “Somaliland.”

If the “Somaliland” secession case has no coherent theory to stand on, there are three major wrinkles of global and local nature that had impeded the coming of recognition from either neighboring countries or from the rest of the world community. First is the “impromptu” nature of this secession case; declared only few days after Mr. Ahmed Silanyo’s distribution of a draft “Proposal for Establishing a Transitional Government” of unity, potentially federal government reflecting the original political belief of the front, the Buroa Convention in May, 1992, poses challenge and makes this action unacceptable in the eyes of the world community. If the annulment of a marriage between a man and a woman would require intervention and a negotiated settlement, one would rightfully think that annulling the unity of a country would be much harder. The nonchalant annulment of the union by the SNM is hardly a shrewd political move. A second factor relates to existing international instruments pertaining and regulating national self- determination and the territorial integrity of member states. As things stand, “the greatest hurdle to ‘Somaliland's’ ambitions for independence, however, is that Somalia refuses to grant a divorce.”66

Other more relevant instruments, including Resolutions (1541) (XV) and (2649) (XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly, the AU’s article 3 of its principles and the Arab League charter in particular, also do not endorse such a unilateral action. The third and perhaps the most consequential problem is the clan factor. Those clans who oppose the “impromptu” secession perceive Somaliland as a project sponsored by one clan (Isaaq) without any open, frank, and fair debate on the future and political choices of each clan in the region. Of the four major clans that make up the communities in the region, only the Isaaq clan is known to be diehard supporter of secession from the rest of the country. Adamantly and with equal zeal opposed to such move are mainly the Daarood clans (the Dhulbahante and Walsangale) who openly defied this proposal from the beginning. Because of their fierce opposition to any move on breaking up Somalia into north and south, the Daarood clans in the eastern half of the region are not administered by Hargaysa, but by Puntland, an autonomous region that opted for a federal system of government.67

“Somaliland” has so far been walking on a fragile thin-razor robe that could easily be broken by the slightest clan conflict, especially if triggered by changing the status quo. In October/November, 2005, when the incident of a young Daarood girl, who was raped, tortured and imprisoned by the body guard of the vice president (now president) of “Somaliland,” eclipsed all other aspects of life in the regions of both Puntland and Somaliland, an all-out war between the clans became almost inevitable. In the following weeks, in Hargaysa, “for several nights Isaaq neighbors threw stones at houses of a Dhulbahante member of the House of representative of Somaliland, who lived with his family in the city for year.” These developments led to a limited degree of population shifts and internal displacement, often Daaroods fleeing Isaaq dominated towns. Two recent forays by “Somaliland” into Daarood districts (in 2003 and 2007), often attempting to respond to outside events related to the search for recognition, produced low-intensity but potentially far-reaching conflicts; this must serve us as a cautionary note. Highlighting the potential danger awaiting the people in the region, in the event that exogenous forces attempt to compromise on the territorial integrity of Somalia by way of recognizing secession without public and open discourse on the issue by all clans concerned, the Northern Somalis for Peace and Unity’s (NSPU) position paper entitled “Illusory ‘Somaliland’: Setting the Record Straight” gives a stern warning, “Recognition will most certainly lead to war since the secessionist will be tempted to try again to overrun Cayn, Sole and Sanag, thus provoking war with Puntland, which even involve the national government.” To avoid such potential inter-clan conflict, one is forced to turn to Markus Hoehne`s soberly cautious recommendation to maintain the status quo, “further endeavors to set up a fully effective state (be it Somaliland or Puntland/Somalia) recognized under international law may produce large-scale armed conflict.”68

1 “Somaliland” would be in quotation throughout the paper to denote that it is not an official country, yet. Also, clan names are used only for clarity purposes and for historical references. I am most indebted to my friend Said M. M. Shire (Said Suggan) of Somali Studies Association who provided me with valuable references and doubly guided me to the right materials on the subject matter, including advising that I use the term “reunification” to denote the important fact that Somalis were of one people prior to the advent of colonialism. Said’s command of modern history of Northern Somalia and his ownership of valuable [original] collections as well as rare secondary materials in this field makes him an emerging authority in this area.

2For a discussion on failed states, see D. W. Brinkerhoff, "Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes," Public Administration and Development 25 (2005), pp. 3-14.

3 Alison K. Eggers, “When is A State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland” Boston College International Law Review, 2007, Vol. 30, Pp 211-222

4 Suliman Baldo, Africa program Director at the International Crisis Group (ICG), June 30, 2006.

5 James Swan, Assistant Undersecretary for African Affairs, speaks about seed seed money the US government provided for humanitarian assistance ($64 million in 2006-2007) and for law and order ($1.7 million), CISS: Sept. 15, 2007.

6Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Debating Shift of Support in Somali Conflict, Washington Post, December 4, 2007.

7 See “Critical Remarks on the National Question” in “V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th English Edition, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964,) Vol. 20, pp 17-51. Pre-Soviet Russia was known by leftists as the “prison of nations” for it encompassed in its geography many non-Russian oppressed ethnic groups and nationalities. In a limited sense, some Ethiopian leftists also referred to Ethiopia as a “prison of nations.” Feudalism reigned in both Russia and Ethiopia where serfdom thrived until revolutions with Marxist orientations reformed both societies.

8 Phifer, Gregg «Woodrow Wilson's Swing around the Circle in Defense of His League», in Florida State University Studies, Tallahassee, Fla., Florida State University, 1956, No. 23, pp. 65-102.

9 Wilson’s 14 points were the basis for establishing the League of Nations at the turn of the 20th Century, a period when Europe was going through significant territorial restructuring.

10 Lee J. M. Seymour, “The Surprising Success of “Separatist” Groups: The Empirical and Juridical in Self Determination,” Paper for the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, March, 2006.

11 Hakan Wieber, “Self-Determination as an International Issue,” in I.M. Lewis, National & Self Determination, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, pp. 43-65.

12 Pierre Englerbert and Rebecca Hummel: “Let’s Stick Together, Understanding Africa’s Secession Deficit,” Africa Affairs, 2005, 104/416, pp. 299-342. Their discussion is important in establishing threshold to assess and best estimate those cases that could succeed for being reproduced as new states with recognition. They also maintain that many secession cases die out in time.

13 Englerber and Hummel, 2005, pp. 299-342.

14 Iqbal Jhazbahy, “Somaliland: Africa’s Best-Kept Secret: A Challenge to International Community?” in Matt Bryden, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (African Affairs Journal, London 2007) pp. 106-165.

15 Resolution (1541) (XV) of the General Assembly is applied to colonies or territories administered by a colonizing country with distinct national characteristics, while Resolution (264) (XXV) in Article 1”affirms the legitimacy of peoples under colonial and alien domination, and, as Hakan suggested, has been applied to Rhodesia, Apartheid South Africa, Palestine. A similar opinion is expressed by John Chipman. In “Managing the Politics of Parochialism.” He states: “...neither in the instruments of the United Nations, nor in customary international law as a whole, does there exist any legal right to independence, by means of the right of self-determination for any non-colonial people or for a minority within an existing state” (“Ethnic Conflict and International Security,” ed. Michael E.Brown, 1995, p.242). This post WWII thinking of managing internal conflicts support more the upholding of Somalia’s territorial integrity than sanctioning the “impromptu” secession of the breakaway “Somaliland” region.

16 In the western half of the continent, the Biafran attempt to secede (1967) from Africa’s largest democracy and most populous nation, Nigeria, has ended as being a historical footnote in secessionist and protest history.

17Kiflu Tadasse. The Generations, (The Red Sea Press, 1993) pp. 123-165. Tadesse, a member of the radical underground party, Ethiopian People Liberation Party, documents the story of 40 years of intellectual debate on the Ethiopian polity and the centrality of the “national question.” These debates at minimum are guide to understand how these debates created an inter-ethnic and multi-cultural political consciousness among the elites.

18 Edmond Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic (Indian University Press, 1988) pp.2 and 44.

19 There have recently been numerous lead articles in both the New York Times (July, 23, 2007) and the Chicago Tribune (July 21,2007) of the accounts of human disaster raging in the region and the resilience of the secession sentiments among the residents, despite the claim of the Ethiopian government that the region is autonomous and has self- rule.

20 Owing to its religious affinity with Somalis, Eastern Oromia, including parts of Harar and Bale, has a much earlier national consciousness and history of resistance to the central authority in Addis Ababa than the rest of Oromo regions.

21 Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Red Sea Press, 1980)

pp 60-65. 22 Habte Selassie, ibid. 1980, p. 63. 23 The Dergi regime in Ethiopia instituted reformist legislations, between 1975

1985, that gave “Ras Gas,” (limited regional autonomy) to a number of

ethnic regions including Eritrea, Afars and Somalis. 24 Alison Eggers, ibid, 2007, Vol. 30, Pp. 211-222. 25 Matt Bryden, “Somalia and “Somaliland”: “Envisioning a Dialogue on the

Question of Somali unity,” African Security Review, 2004 13/2.

26 Faisal Roble, “Somalia, A Nation without an Elite-based Movement: Challenges and Opportunities” http//Wardheernews.com, February _2006.html. In “A Proposal for Establishing a Transitional Government,” which Silanyo drafted and sheepishly dropped off in a matter of days and joined company with those advocating for secession at the convention in Burao city (May, 18, 1991), denoting the “impromptu” nature of the unilateral secession of Northern Somalia.

27 I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call to Kinship; (The Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, N.J.) p.180, 1994; Gerard Prunier, “A Candid View of the Somali National Movement,” (Horn of Africa Journal, 13-14, January-June, 1990-91, pp. 107-120.

28 Cedric Barnes, U Dhashay-Ku Dhashay: “Genealogical and Territorial discourse in Somali History,” Social Identity, Vol. 12, 4: pp. 487-498; See Ali Hersi, unpublished Doctoral Thesis, “The Arab Factor in Somali History, UCLA, 1978

29 http/www.wardheernews.com/Article_02/feb_02/Egalas letter.pdf 30 http/www.wardheernews.com/Article_02/feb_02/Egalas letter.pdf 31 http/www.warhdeernews, ibid, 2006. 32 I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 1994, pp. 178-219. 33 Hussein M. Adam, “Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in

Contrast to Eritrea.” Review of Africa Political Economy, 1994, 59 pp. 2138.

34 I.M. Lewis, ibid. 1994, p. 177.

35 I. M. Lewis, ibid. 1994, op.cit. 197. But an oral account narrated to the author by the late Mohamed Farah Xasharo, founder of the Gudabursi-based Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) differed Lewis’ version. Xasharo, who was a delegate to a small group gathering of SNM leaders at a private residence in the late 1970s in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, is that all that SNM wanted was token non-Isaaq individuals to join the front.

36 Daniel Compognon, “The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and Questions,” Horn of Africa Journal, 13-14, Nos. 1-2, January-June, 190-91, 107-20.

37 Jama Mohammed Qaalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. Lilian Barber Press, 1995, pp. 267.

38Robert Jackson and Carl Roseburg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982): pp. 19 - 23.

39 Somaliland Trade Directory, Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (SCCIA), Hargaysa, Somaliland, 2003-2004; there is no reliable census to register inhabitants, thus anywhere from 2.5 million to Hargaysa’s 3.5 million is the range used by different analysts.

40 Asteries Hiliaras, “The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics,” (Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2, 20, 2002).

41 See “The Illusory “Somaliland”: Setting the Record Straight,” Research Unit, 2006. For a list of the treaties signed between Great Britain and Somali clans, with the exception of the Dhulbahante clan, in the Ex-British Protectorate, see exhibits A through G showing. http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_06/may_06/ILLUSORY__”SOM ALILAND”.pdf

42 See British Somaliland, Vol. IX, No.I, (Published by The British Society for international Understanding, January, 1948) p.15

43 Harold Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, 1982, p. 34

44 I.M. Lewis, a Modern History of Somalia (West View Press, 1988) p. 166. For a general discussion on the question of Somali Territory and its partition, the Haud and Reserved Area in particular, see John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, 1968.

45 Harold Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, 1982, p. 3

46 http://www.hartf ord-hwp.com/archives/33/113.html. IRIN, 10, July 2001

47 David Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State, West View, Colorado, 1987, p. 67.

48 Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration, The Grange Press, 1969, p. 9.

49The epic poems of Guba, which started in the 1930s and ran through 1950, clearly express the level of wide clan conflict along Isaaq vs. Ogaden, or Ogaden vs Dhulbahante, or Dhulbhante vs. Isaaq axis.

50David Shin, Somaliland: The Little Country that Could (CSIS, African Notes, November, No. 9, 2002).

51Peter J. Schraeder. “Why the United States Recognize Somaliland,” (http://forums.csis.org/africa/?cat=2CSIS Africa Policy Forum, 2006.) One of the reasoning why US policy makers should overlook the clan is in appraising the question to recognize “Somaliland” is to stick to the “1884” colonial border, insinuating that this reason would strike cord with the OAU (now AU’) principles of “no change to colonial borders.” His argument appears simplistic in that the protection of territorial integrity needs to be evaluated in light of the young and soft states that exist in Africa. In a recent article by the Washington Post (December 4, 2007) officials at the Pentagon, responding to its need for the use of the military facilities in Barbara, indicated their “eagerness to recognize Somaliland,” although the State Department “stands in the way.”

52 http://www.timothygoddard.com/blog/?p=238#comment-303766

53 President Rayale has in numerous speeches and interviews invoked, often sounding half-heartedly committed to secession, this concept of “taking back” sovereignty from the south.

54 Several political leaders of the secessionist region, including the current sitting president, Reyale Kahin, as well as some Somalia observers content that as many as 35 member states have recognized “Somaliland” on the wake of its independence from Great Britain in 1960. See David Shin, ibid, no. 9, 2002. But there are no records that have been sited or presented by either politicians or Shin himself, despite the later being a long time US Diplomat.

55 Shin, ibid, 2002.

56 Paola Contine, Somalia: An experiment in Legal Integration, London, Frank Cass, 1969, viii+92 and Pp. 10-11

57 C. 32-Act of Union, Law No.5 of January, 1961, 33-Supra, p.9. The repeal, did not apply to Section, 11(4) of that law The Act of Union Page 12-13

58 NSPU: ibid, 2006.

59 Interview with Dr. Ahmed Issa in “Taking the initiative: Somaliland’s Regional Opportunities for International Recognition,” 2006, Graduate program in International Affairs (GIPA0, The New School.

60 Hussein Adam, From Tyran to Anarchy: The Somali Experience, Red Sea Press, 2007; pp. 183-213. See also “Taking Initiative, interview with Ahmed Issa, a member of SNM and KULMIYE party in Hargaysa staunchly maintains that secession is call not to be negotiated.

61Lewis, Nationalism and Self Determination, ibid, op.cit., p. 9

62 Hussein M. Adam “Language, National Consciousness and Identity-The

Somali Experience,” in I.M. Lewis, 1994, ibid, p. op.cit., 33. 63 David Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia, 1987, p. 67. 64 Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Myth or Rhetoric, (Boulder, Colorado,

1984), p. 45. 65 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. UC Press, 1998, ibid. pp.

151–166. 66 International Crisis Report, June, 2006. 67Since October,, 2007 militia loyal to “Somaliland” has violently captured Las

Anod, the main city in the Dhulbahante country, thus leading to a potential era for a renewed conflict.

68 Markus V. Hoehne, “Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 44-3, Cambridge University Press , 2006, pp. 394-414.

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