It was a measure of Somalia’s desperation that when the TFG was cobbled together by outsiders in Kenya, many Somalis chose to hold their nose and give the benefit of their doubt to a rotten “government” whose leaders, ministers and parliamentarians were mostly venal opportunists and former or practicing warlords. Faced with a Hobson’s choice, there was that faint hop, more accurately a pipe dream, that the members of the Embgathi-made establishment would somehow transform themselves in due course into born-again nationalists and rise to the critical tasks at hand and the daunting challenges ahead.
Pipe dreams might sooth the agony of belonging to a failed state for a while, but inevitably they give way to reality and its pain. That this government would miserably fail to deliver on any front or part of its programme –if it had one- was quite predictable. Few Somalis, if any, are likely to be disillusioned since expectations were very law, if not non-existent in the first place. What makes the TFG unbearable is not its failures per se; hardened and resilient Somalis could have lived with a failed government as they did with a failed State for all the 17 years since 1991. However, what makes this government worse than its predecessors, or even those times under the warlords, is that, in addition to its failures, it has sold out Somalia’s sovereignty as it ingratiates itself to foreign governments
An unelected government devoid of legitimacy and public support at home is forced to look to foreign governments for the financial and diplomatic support it critically needs for its survival. Notwithstanding this government’s illegitimacy, failures and unpopularity, foreign governments have kept it alive all the same, not because it deserves it, nor for the good of the Somali people, but for the simple reason that the alternative to the TFG could be far worse from their perspective. The thought of the Islamists, or worse Al Shabab, taking over the country is sufficient to make them rally to the TFG and sustain it. In return for the financial and diplomatic support it receives, the TFG repays its backers by cashing on the only asset at its disposal, namely the country’s sovereignty.
A government (and parliament) that is not accountable to its own people, and facing no elections in its lifetime or in the foreseeable future, merely exists to feather their own personal nests and remaining in hock to foreign backers rather than promoting and protecting national interest. The disheartening and demeaning spectacle of a President and his Prime Ministers engaged in internecine dogfights, joined by their respective supporters in parliament, is all about personal and clan interests. These are the only times when Somalis are reminded that the TFG does exist; otherwise, it simply disappears from public view and awareness, once such disputes have been sorted out after a lot of money has changed hands.
Of all the damnable actions the TFG has willingly sanctioned, apart from endorsing Ethiopian’s invasion of Somalia, the worse must surely be how it betrayed the country’s sovereignty and transformed Somalia into a vassal state at best, and at worst a no man’s land, where foreign powers, notably western ones, are assured, whatever their pretext, unhindered intervention in Somalia’s land, sea and airspace; where Somalis are liable to be captured (or kidnapped as others see it) and tried in foreign countries for crimes they are alleged to have committed on Somali territorial waters or soil. Somalis might feel aghast at what is being done in their name, but nothing gives the TFG more satisfaction than receiving such requests for intervention which the president and his ministers are willing to grant at the drop of a hat.
Foreign governments, in particular Western ones, treat the TFG in two contradictory ways, depending on their interest: At times when it suits them, they consider it as the internationally recognised government of Somalia and deal with it accordingly. Needless to say, that happens when they need its permission for their intervention in Somalia. Otherwise, they see it as either non existent or non-functioning and hence completely by-pass it. Witness how the French were allowed by the TFG to take captured Somalis to France; or the British navy were able to take Somalis captured from Somalia’s territorial waters to neighbouring Mombassa for trial as if a Somali government and justice system did not exist. And yet, all this is done with the blessing of the TFG. Nothing would shame this so-called government which stops at nothing to betray national sovereignty. But for patriotic Somalis, seeing their country turned into a vassal state, is both painful and humiliating beyond endurance
Until recently, foreign governments conducting their global war on terror or against Somali piracy around the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean would often claim to have the permission of the TFG. Both Ethiopia and the USA claim to have had such permissions when, in the case of Ethiopia, it invaded Somalia with the backing of the USA, or the latter launched intermittent missile and aerial strikes against target inside Somalia allegedly harbouring Al Qeda suspects. Innocent civilians have often been the sole victims but that is a small price to pay for the USA in what it sees as its wider war on terror. No apology or sympathy has been communicated to the victims’ families let alone compensate them for their loss. The USA has a history of riding roughshod over the sovereignty of other countries or the rights of their peoples, but at least their governments complain. Not the TFG. Not a word of protest or complaint. On the contrary, and adding insult to injury, it called the victims terrorists!! So too were labelled the victims of Ethiopia’s savagery in Mogadishu.
If these foreign interventions in Somalia were to end with the passing away of this obsequious TFG, that would have been a welcome consolation giving us light at the end of the dark tunnel. But even if this government disappears- hopefully sooner than later- Somalia is already locked into a situation where what was until recently ad hoc arrangements between the TFG and foreign government is being increasingly transformed into an internationally binding legal obligation. Using the consent of the Somali government as a back-up, the United Nations Security Council has recently adopted a resolution sponsored by Western member States which would permit governments to enter Somali territorial waters in pursuit of alleged pirates. In a similar manner, the USA has presented a draft resolution calling for the extension of this right of intervention to Somalia’s territorial space. What next?
Unlike the ad hoc arrangements with the TFG, the problem with resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations is that it gives the right of open-ended intervention to every country long after the TFG had departed from the scene. To revoke those resolutions in the future, when piracy has ended, will require the necessary approval of the members of the Security Council. That they will do so is not a forgone conclusion. It may not be repealed if it does not receive sufficient support among members, or if it is opposed by any of the veto wielding members. So we could in theory be saddled for ever with such resolutions compromising our sovereignty thanks to own TFG. Foreign governments are keen to keep this sham government in place until it is replaced by one to their satisfaction and certainly not one dominated by Al Shabaab. This is the prospect and legacy that the TFG will pass on to present and future Somali generations
Somalis face two stark options: On the one hand, there is a puppet TFG that controls no part of Somalia except Baidhawa. On the other hand, we have the Al Shabaab led insurgents who control almost all southern Somalia. The TFG faces serious indictments and nothing in its favour. So for me, they are no option. The sooner they are out of the way, the better I would say. What about the Islamist insurgents? Much can be said for them to the extent that they are about to liberate the country from foreign invasion and are on the verge of ousting the TFG -the mother of most of our current predicaments.
The major drawback to the Jihadists, is their extremist fundamentalism which makes them unacceptable to many Somalis. That should not mean that the door has to be closed on them and hopes ruled out that they will reform. Relevant questions can be raised. For example, is their current fundamentalism a permanent ideology or a temporary one born out of the times we have lived over the past 30 years, from the worst years of Mohamed Siyad Barre’s rule to the subsequent era under the warlords, TFG and foreign occupation? Is fundamentalism something they are likely to shed away progressively as they face the reality, a time when occupation, warlords and TFG are longer around to justify jihad, a time when they find themselves among a nation at last at peace, whose people are pragmatic and individualistic and give priority to survival and getting on with their lives rather than indulging in extremist ideology? I am no prophet but I believe the affirmative is possible to these questions.
Foreign powers may wish to stop the Islamists coming power at all costs with the Somalis bearing most of the cost. But for us that is not an acceptable option. If the Islamists were to come to power, it is not in our interest to watch that process passively from the sidelines. Instead, we should do everything in our power to guide and steady them and help in managing the transition from liberation to the building of the nation’s institutions. The well-known adage that “if you cannot beat them join them” is relevant to our situation. Joining and guiding them, given the minimum Islamic credentials, is the best way to defang them, or to take the wind out of their sails as they end their mission of liberating Somalia and settle down to the next phase: running a country for which they have neither the experience nor the competence. I find it difficult to believe that such a group will hold on together in a situation where all the factors responsible for their genesis and Jihad are no longer there. More likely, they will drift back to their families, regions, and occupations, inside and outside government, and get on with their lives like the rest of us.
Mohsin Mahad
Email: mohsinmahad@yahoo.co.uk
We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on MaanHadal.com .
please email your article to Webmaster@Maanhadal.com
Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of MaanHdadal.com